We are happy to invite you to the research seminar by the Center for Economic Expertise. On April 18th Robertas Zubrickas (VU/ University of Bath) will present the topic „Signaling Quality: How Refund Bonuses Can Overcome Information Asymmetries in Crowdfunding" in 417 room and MS Teams.
Brief overview of the seminar
Crowdfunding can suffer from information asymmetry, leaving some investors disappointed with low-quality projects while other high-quality projects remain unfunded. We show that refund bonuses, which provide investors a payment if a fundraising campaign is unsuccessful, can signal project quality and help overcome the market failure in crowdfunding. Because strong projects have a lower risk of bonus payout, entrepreneurs with strong projects are more likely to offer bonuses. This signals high quality to investors, and due to their updated beliefs this drives investment toward such projects. An experiment provides supporting empirical evidence for the benefits of this signaling solution to the problems of information asymmetry in crowdfunding.
Information on the seminar
- Time: April 18, 14:00-15:00
- Venue: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vilnius University, Saulėtekio al. 9, Vilnius, 417 room and MS Teams Click here
- Presenter: dr. Robertas Zubrickas, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Economic Expertise, VU; Lecturer at University of Bath, UK.
- Topic: „Signaling Quality: How Refund Bonuses Can Overcome Information Asymmetries in Crowdfunding"
- Working language: English
The seminar is open to all - students, teachers, researchers. We invite you to learn more!