Maloniai kviečiame dalyvauti moksliniame ekonomikos krypties seminare, kurį skaitys kandidatas į VU EVAF ekonomikos krypties podoktorantūros poziciją Alexandros Rigos.
Pranešimas: Expertise Disclosure in Markets for Credence Goods
Santrauka: In markets for credence goods buyers rely on expert sellers for diagnosis and treatment. This gives sellers incentives to provide buyers with unnecessary services. We theoretically study strategic information transmission in this environment, allowing differentially informed buyers to verifiably communicate their expertise to the sellers. We show that, in equilibrium, it is frequently not optimal for buyers to disclose their level of expertise, and that this—when sellers are unable to distinguish “feigned ignorance” from a genuine lack of expertise—may completely eliminate seller fraud in pooling equilibria. Our results can be used to identify what pieces of information should be provided in public information campaigns that aim to reduce consumer exploitation. They also suggest that such campaigns can be effective even if some buyers do not fully understand their content (because they affect sellers’ beliefs).