Maloniai kviečiame dalyvauti moksliniame ekonomikos krypties seminare.
Vieta: 402 auditorija, VU EVAF
Pranešėja: Vaiva Petrikaitė (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)
Pavadinimas: How much to inform a handyman beforehand
Santrauka: The paper studies a market where two firms provide personalized services to a unit mass consumers. Service contracts are signed either in a traditional way or via online platforms. Traditional contracts require consumers to contact firms sequentially by paying some cost and to reveal service provision costs. Meanwhile, signing a contract online does not require any additional effort from consumers and firms observe imperfect signals controlled by consumers about the costs. Firms tend to offer online contracts more often if the signals are more precise. Thus by potential savings on contact costs, consumers are encouraged to provide more information online. However, more informative signals allow to isolate captive consumers better, which raises service prices. How much information is provided online and how the trade takes place depend on the correlation of service provision costs across firms.
Seminaras vyks anglų kalba. Ekonomikos krypties doktorantų dalyvavimas yra privalomas.